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    Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to study the factors that drive fiscal vulnerability in the European Union 
countries. For this purpose, we employ a logit model with random effects for a balanced panel 
comprising of 20 countries and on annual data extracted for 2000-2012. We use as a dependent a 
dummy variable which takes value of 1 if fiscal policy is assessed as being vulnerable, and 0, otherwise. 
As explanatories, we use two distinct categories which capture the intrinsic and the exogenous sources 
of fiscal vulnerability. The results show that higher overall taxation and non-distortionary taxes 
decrease the likelihood of fiscal policy to be vulnerable, whilst the size of total and of productive 
government expenditures contribute to an increase in the fiscal vulnerability. Tight fiscal policy has an 
important contribution to decrease in the fiscal vulnerability. The responsiveness of fiscal policy 
through discretionary actions also is more likely to reduce fiscal vulnerability that through the 
automatic response of stabilizers. Improved economic condition mitigate the risk of one country to 
become more fiscal vulnerable, whilst large financial sector increase the probability. Tighter control 
of corruption will lead to a decrease in fiscal vulnerability, while stronger rule of law contributes to 
growth in fiscal vulnerability.            
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1.Introduction 
Since the European sovereign debt crisis in 2009 there has been an increased interest in the study of 
fiscal vulnerability. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission (EC) provided 
various methodologies of early detecting fiscal vulnerabilities (i.e. Baldacci, McHucgh and Petrova, 
2011; Baldacci, Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu and Mazraani, 2011; Schaechter et al, 2012; Berti, Salto 
and Lequien, 2012). Moreover, some of the financial institutions developed their own measures for 
assessing the degree of fiscal vulnerability, thus providing useful insights for their investors (i.e. 
BlackRock Investment Institute, 2011; Hayes, 2011).  
Most of the suggested methodologies relies upon several relevant indicators believed that they can 
signal fiscal distress. But, one question which can arise is that if these indicators actually represent 
sources of fiscal vulnerability or if they just capture the weaknesses in the fiscal policy. If we think, for 
instance, to the budgetary deficit which is one of the basic variables most frequently used for detecting 
fiscal vulnerabilities, we can ask whether this is a source or just and effect of some intrinsic weaknesses 
in the fiscal policy, such as poor tax compliance or increased tax evasion which negatively affect 
government revenues, hence causing large deficits.      
There are only few papers providing extended discussions on the sources of fiscal vulnerability 
(Hemming and Petrie, 2000; Cottarelli, 2011; Greene, 2012) which can be grouped as: (i) weak initial 
fiscal position referring to large budgetary deficits and high indebtedness rates which increase the 
exposure to the solvency risks; (ii) uncertainty taking in consideration the variations of fiscal outcomes 
to changes or shocks in key macroeconomic variables; (iii) long term risks implying the exposure to 
important structural changes in demographics (i.e. the impact of ageing population and pensions and 
health spending) or economy (i.e. the exhaustion on medium term of resources for mineral and oil 
exporting countries) which might affect fiscal sustainability in the long run; (iv) structural weaknesses 
indicating the vulnerabilities in the composition of the government revenues and expenditures (i.e. the 
composition of revenues dominated by few taxes having narrow bases, high proportion of non-
discretionary spending or large items of expenditures which are resilient to adjustments), inconsistent 
tax legislation and poor quality of government (i.e. inappropriate roles and responsibilities of the 
government, weak budgeting process, corruption); (v) non-fiscal sources suggesting the vulnerabilities 
induced by the financial sector and by the economic openness: credit or asset price bubbles, too-short 
maturities, heavy borrowing in foreign currency, or non-performing loans and large acquisitions of 
risky financial assets could lead to bank failures and the need for greater government expenditures to 
prevent the systemic risk or to recapitalize the banking system could generate fiscal vulnerability; 
economic openness plays an important role in fostering fiscal vulnerability because it renders a country 
to external economic conditions exposing itself to a larger degree of shock over which it has no direct 
or relatively little control. 
In our understanding, fiscal vulnerability can be driven by: (i) inherent factors which refer to the intrinsic 
weaknesses of fiscal policy such as:  poor composition of the government revenues and expenditures 
(sizeable transfer payments, small size of discretionary expenditures), reduced tax compliance and 
large tax evasion or poor synchronization between government revenues and expenditures, the 
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maturity structure, interest, and currency composition of the public debt, the type of fiscal policy (lax 
or restrictive) and its correlation with the business cycle (pro-cyclical vs. anti-cyclical), the low 
responsiveness of fiscal policy due to small share or to non-operational automatic stabilizers, poor 
budgeting process, the quality of fiscal institutions, government assets and liabilities management etc., 
and (ii) exogenous factors which are not specific to fiscal policy but affect the size, the dynamics and the 
composition of basic fiscal variables on short, medium and long term, such as poor economic 
conditions, financial sector spillovers, demographic, political or environmental changes. 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive investigation on the factors which drive the 
fiscal vulnerability. For this purpose, the reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the methodology employed and the dataset. Section 3 presents and discusses the results and 
Section 4 draws the main concluding remarks of this study. 
 
2.Empirical methodology and the dataset 
In order to study the determinants of fiscal vulnerability, we employ a logit regression for a balanced 
panel using as dependent a dummy which takes value of 1 if fiscal policy is vulnerable and 0, otherwise. 
Equation (1) describes the model: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = Pr⁡(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜈𝑖)        (1) 
For i=1,….,n countries and t=1,…,T years. yit is the dependent variable for each country, i, at time t; 
xit is the set of explanatory variables for each country i at time t; νi are i.i.d N(0,σν
2). 
For the dependent variable (yit) we use the results provided by Stoian, Obreja Brașoveanu, Dumitrescu 
and Brașoveanu (2015) for the European Union countries. They developed a new methodology (V-
L-D) for detecting fiscal vulnerabilities which relies upon two indicators: one level indicator capturing 
the weaknesses signaled by the size of the cyclically adjusted balance and by distance-to-stability, and 
one dynamics indicator showing the vulnerabilities signaled by the changes in the cyclically adjusted 
balance and in the public debt, both to-GDP ratios, for two consecutive years. Authors’ view on fiscal 
vulnerability is that it represents ‘any kind of intrinsic weakness in the existing fiscal policy or exogenous shocks that 
lead to a significant deterioration in the level and/or dynamics of the budgetary deficit and/or public debt over the short 
term that will limit the government’s ability to achieve its goals’. They considered budgetary deficit and public 
debt as relevant indicators signaling fiscal vulnerability caused by inherent or exogenous factors. This 
is consistent with our beliefs on the sources which drive fiscal vulnerability, thus arguing the use of 
this framework for the purpose of our investigation. The V-L-D detects 5 categories of vulnerabilities 
from none to extreme vulnerability. Additional findings showed that financial markets react 
significantly to strong and extreme vulnerability. Thus, we build our dependent variable (vulnerability) 
as a dummy which takes value of 1 if V-L-D indicates strong and extreme vulnerability and 0, 
otherwise (see Table 1 in the Appendix). 
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For the explanatory variables we use two distinct sets. One describing the intrinsic sources of fiscal 
vulnerability,(Iit) and the other indicating the exogenous ones, (Eit). Thus, equation (1) can be re-
written as: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0|𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝐸𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃(𝐼𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝜗𝑖)       (2) 
The variables describing the intrinsic sources of fiscal vulnerability are grouped into five categories: (i) 
one category consists in variables measuring the fiscal position through the size of government 
revenues and expenditures. We use the current tax burden (burden) as proxy for the government 
revenues and government expenditures as GDP ratio (expenditures). (ii) one category comprising of 
variables indicating the composition of government revenues and expenditures. Following Barro 
(1990), we group the current tax burden into distortionary and non-distortionary taxes and the government 
expenditures into productive and unproductive spending. The reason of splitting the revenues and 
expenditures is given by Barro’s findings that taxes and spending behave differently and have distinct 
impact on economic growth. This classification is widely used in studies examining the impact on 
fiscal policy on economic growth. For the purpose of our investigation, we use the categories provided 
by Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999). They group taxation on income and profit, social security 
contributions taxation on payroll and manpower and taxation on property as distortionary taxes and 
taxation on domestic goods and services as non-distortionary one. Also, they consider general public 
services, educational, defence, health, housing, transport and communication expenditures as 
productive, and social security and welfare, recreation, and economic services expenditures as 
unproductive ones.  Thus, we consider as distortionary taxation the direct taxes and social security 
contributions, and as non-distortionary taxation, the indirect taxes. We use the collective consumption 
expenditures for the productive spending and total social transfers as unproductive one. (iii) one category 
describing the type of fiscal policy by using we use the fiscal impulse. Schinasi and Lutz (1991) defined 
fiscal impulse as ‘measuring the change in government budget balance resulting from changes in 
government expenditure and tax policy’. Alesina and Perotti (1995) suggested the use of fiscal impulse 
in order to assess fiscal stance as being tight or expansionary. We calculate the fiscal impulse as annual 
changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. We decided to use the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance for two reasons: on one hand, we can capture the true nature of fiscal policy by eliminating 
the influences coming from the business cycle, and, on the other hand, we can avoid the effects of 
past deficits on current fiscal policy.   We give lower scores for fiscal impulse indicating tight or strong 
fiscal adjustments reasoning that during consolidation fiscal vulnerability should be reduced (Daniel, 
Davis, Fouad and Van Rijckeghem, 2006). (iv) one category capturing the responsiveness of fiscal 
policy during the cyclically swings. Fiscal policy plays an important role to stabilize the economy. The 
reaction can be automatic through the automatic stabilizers which ensures a prompter, self-correcting 
fiscal response or can be delayed through employment of discretionary actions (Baunsgaard and 
Symansky, 2009). Automatic stabilizers can be defined as variations in taxes (i.e. business and personal) 
and government transfers (i.e. unemployment benefits) that occur automatically in response to 
changes in output and employment (IMF, 2015). Hence, they can smooth the business cycle and allow 
fiscal policy to act countercyclical. The size of the automatic stabilizers can be commonly 
approximated by the ratio of general government expenditures to GDP (Debrun and Kapoor, 2010). 
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But, considering the development of our investigation and the fact that we have already used 
government expenditures to GDP ratio as a proxy for fiscal position, we decided to employ a different 
method to assess the size of the automatic stabilizers. IMF (2015) reported fiscal stabilization 
coefficient for the advanced and emerging economies worldwide which resulted from country specific 
OLS regressions of the overall budget balance on the output gap. Taking into account that we use 
annual data for our estimations, we calculate the annual changes in the overall balance to annual 
changes in the output gap (stabilizers) (see Table 1 in the Appendix).  One way of assessing the 
discretionary fiscal policy (impulse) is to calculate the changes in the cyclically adjusted balance 
(Blanchard, 1990). For this, we calculate the annual changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
which we consider a better indicator for discretionary fiscal policy considering that it excludes the 
interest payments on public debt which are assessed as nondiscretionary type. (v) one category 
describing the fiscal institutions. Fiscal institution is a broad concept and consists of several various 
aspects, such as: fiscal norms, rules and institutions or budget process (Hallerberg and Yläoutinen, 
2010). For the purpose of our study, we focus only on the fiscal rules (rule) ‘which entail substantive 
constraints on public spending, taxation, deficit and debt, usually in the form of explicit quantitative 
targets’ (Raudla, 2014). Fiscal rules can contribute to a decrease in fiscal vulnerability because they aim 
at imposing durable fiscal discipline and overcome the problem of deficit bias (Daniel, Davis, Fouad 
and Van Rijckeghem, 2006). We use in our analysis, the Fiscal Rule Index developed by the European 
Commission (2015).           
For the exogenous factors which might affect fiscal vulnerability, we use real GDP growth rate (growth) 
describing overall economic conditions within one country; domestic credit to private sector as GDP 
ratio (financial) measuring the size of the financial sector; the economic openness (external) as volume 
of trades (exports and imports) to GDP ratio assessing the external sector, and the quality of 
government institutions captured by various indicators, such as government effectiveness (effectiveness), 
regulatory quality (regulatory), rule of law (law) and control of corruption (corruption) as in Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). 
We run equation (2) for a balanced panel comprising of 20 European Union countries and on annual 
data extracted for 2000-2012. The countries considered for investigation are: Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We 
provide details about each variable employed in our investigation as well as the data source in Table 1 
in the Appendix. We also report the descriptive statistics in Table 2 and 3 in the Appendix. 
 
3.Results and discussions 
Using equation (2), we estimated several models. We ran the logit separately using first as a proxy for 
the fiscal position the government revenues (burden) and its components (non-distortionary and 
distortionary) and then the government expenditures (expenditures) and its components (productive and 
unproductive). Then, we added the variables describing the type of fiscal policy (type), the responsiveness 
(stabilizers and impulse) and the fiscal institutions (rule). We decided to study them separately, in order 
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to avoid any inter-influences. The variables which capture the exogenous sources of fiscal vulnerability 
are kept in each model and they act as control variables. The results are reported in Table 4.1 and 4.2 
in the Appendix. 
The results show that higher tax burden and non-distortionary taxes significantly decrease the 
probability that fiscal policy to be vulnerable, whilst the total and the productive government 
expenditures increase the likelihood of fiscal vulnerability. We found no evidence for the distortionary 
taxes and for the unproductive government expenditures to contribute to fiscal vulnerability. 
With regard to the type of fiscal policy, we introduce it as a factor variables, hence allowing us to study 
the impact of each type. For categorical variables, we assess the impact of each category by comparison 
with the base category which in our case is the category indicating very tight or strong fiscal 
adjustments. We observe that the type of fiscal policy has a significant contribution to fiscal 
vulnerability. The results suggest that tight fiscal policy has the largest impact in decreasing fiscal 
vulnerability compared with neutral, loose or expansionary fiscal policy. 
The responsiveness of fiscal policy through discretionary actions is more likely to reduce fiscal 
vulnerability that through the automatic response of stabilizers. This finding is consistent with what 
IMF (2015) suggested that ‘fiscal response of the advanced economies to the global financial crisis 
showed the importance of discretionary actions in mitigating the effects of a severe slump’. 
Strengthening the fiscal rules would not play such an important role for decreasing the probability of 
fiscal policy to be vulnerable. We observed that only in the cases of distortionary taxes and 
unproductive spending fiscal rules become more relevant.  
Improving economic conditions has a significant contribution to the reduction of fiscal vulnerability. 
By comparison, large financial sector stimulates the increase in the probability to be more vulnerable. 
We found no relevant influence on fiscal vulnerability coming from the external sector. 
Concerning the governance indicators, the results show that the rule of law and the control of 
corruption have a significant influence on fiscal vulnerability. Increasing control of corruption will 
lead to a decrease in the probability that fiscal policy to be vulnerable. On contrary, having stronger 
rule of law will determine an increase in the likelihood of one country to be more vulnerable.    
 
4.Concluding remarks 
Fiscal vulnerability has been a much debated topic in the last years since the financial crisis in 2007-
08. Trying to cope with the effects of economic recession afterwards and to avoid public debt to have 
unstable trajectories leading to sovereign debt crisis like in the case of Greece and Cyprus, made 
European governments to take severe fiscal consolidation actions and to be more aware of factors 
that might drive fiscal vulnerability. Since then, there has been a large focus on developing 
methodologies easily to be implemented in order to early signal vulnerabilities in fiscal policy. More 
of the developments with this regard have come from the International Monetary Fund and the 
European Commission on their permanent monitoring mission.  
Fiscal vulnerability assessment frameworks have relied on a set of indicators which were assumed to 
have a high power in detecting fiscal vulnerabilities. But, the existed literature hasn’t provided yet and 
result concerning the factors which may drive fiscal vulnerability. There are only few papers describing 
and discussing the potential sources of fiscal vulnerability. Thus, the aim of this paper was to develop 
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an empirical study of the determinants of fiscal vulnerability. For this purpose, we employed a logit 
model for a balanced panel comprising of 20 European Union countries and on annual dataset 
extracted from 2000-2012. We used as dependent a dummy variable taking value of 1 if fiscal policy 
was assessed as being vulnerable, and 0, otherwise. For the explanatory, we employed two distinct sets 
of variables, one capturing the intrinsic sources of fiscal vulnerability, and one describing the 
exogenous ones. For the former, we introduced variables describing the fiscal position, the 
composition of government revenues and expenditures, the type and the responsiveness of fiscal 
policy, and the fiscal institutions. For the latter, we focused on the economic condition, on the 
influence of the financial and external sectors and on governance.    
The results showed that higher taxation and non-distortionary taxes reduce the likelihood of fiscal 
policy to be vulnerable. The size of total and of productive government expenditures have a significant 
contribution to the increase in the probability of fiscal vulnerability. Tight fiscal policy decreases the 
vulnerability by comparison with neutral, loose or expansionary fiscal policy. The discretionary actions 
are more likely to reduce the probability of fiscal vulnerability than the response through the automatic 
stabilizers. Also, improved economic conditions have a significant contribution in lowering fiscal 
vulnerability, whilst large financial sector has a positive effect on rising vulnerability. Stronger control 
of corruption will lead to a decrease in fiscal vulnerability, while tighter rule of law contributes to 
growth in fiscal vulnerability. 
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Appendix 
Table 1   Description of the dataset 
Variable Description Data source 
vulnerability 0, if fiscal policy is non, low or moderate (V-L-D is 0, 1 or 2) 
1, if fiscal policy is strong or extremely vulnerable (V-L-D is 3 or 4) 
Stoian, Obreja 
Brasoveanu, 
Dumitrescu and  
Brasoveanu 
(2015) 
burden  The current tax burden of total economy is the sum of indirect taxes, 
direct taxes and social security contributions as GDP ratio 
Ameco 
expenditures Total general government expenditures as GDP ratio Ameco 
distortionary Direct taxes and actual social security contributions as GDP ratio Ameco 
nondistortionary Indirect taxes as GDP ratio Ameco 
productive Collective consumption expenditures as GDP ratio Ameco 
unproductive Social transfers in kind and social benefits other than social transfers in 
kind as GDP ratio 
Ameco 
type 0, indicating very tight or strong adjustments if fiscal impulse ≤ -1.5% 
1, indicating tight fiscal policy if fiscal impulse ∈ (-1.5%, -0.5%) 
2, indicating neutral fiscal policy if fiscal impulse ∈ [-0.5%, 0.5%) 
3, indicating loose fiscal policy if fiscal impulse ∈ [0.5%, 1.5%) 
4, indicating expansionary fiscal policy if fiscal impulse ≥1.5% 
Ameco 
stabilizers Changes in overall budget balance to changes in output gap.  
Overall budget balance is net lending/borrowing of general government 
Output gap is the gap between actual and trend gross domestic product 
at 2010 reference levels 
Ameco 
impulse Annual changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as GDP ratio Ameco 
rule Fiscal Rule Index European 
Commission, 
Direcorate 
General for the 
Economic and 
Financial 
Affiairs 
growth Real GDP growth rate calculated as the percentage change of real GDP Ameco 
financial Domestic credit to private sector as GDP ratio World Bank 
external Volumes of imports and exports as GDP ratio Ameco 
effectiveness  Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
regulatory Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
law Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
10 
 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
corruption Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
 
 
Table 2   Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean St.dev Median Min Max 
burden 37.47 5.67 36.83 27.78 49.58 
expenditures 45.95 6.01 46.57 31.06 66.06 
nondistortionary 13.63 2.75 13.23 8.55 22.99 
distortionary 22.92 4.54 22.68 14.46 32.20 
productive 8.40 1.30 8.23 5.44 11.78 
unproductive 26.16 4.84 26.57 14.54 36.64 
impulse -0.10 2.43 -0.16 -17.79 18.74 
stabilizers 40.17 630.07 0.46 -31.76 10160.01 
rule 0.32 0.93 0.21 -1.01 3.05 
growth 2.00 3.29 2.22 -17.70 10.99 
financial 113.10 56.44 105.22 19.24 305.09 
external 105.56 52.48 97.69 26.96 323.01 
effectiveness 1.38 0.52 1.46 0.21 2.36 
regulatory 1.33 0.35 1.28 0.54 2.08 
law 1.30 0.49 1.34 0.14 2.00 
corruption 1.29 0.75 1.31 -0.29 2.59 
 
Table 3  Statistics for the factor variables 
Variable Freq. Percent Cum. 
vulnerability 
0 
1 
213 
47 
81.92 
18.08 
81.92 
100.00 
type 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
48 
48 
88 
38 
38 
 
18.46 
18.46 
33.85 
14.62 
14.62 
 
18.46 
36.92 
70.77 
85.38 
100.00 
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Table 4.1 Logit panel with random effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES             
             
burden -0.179*** -0.182*** -0.172*** -0.185***         
 (0.0604) (0.0622) (0.0582) (0.0642)         
1.type  -1.475**    -1.480**    -1.617**   
  (0.665)    (0.659)    (0.703)   
2.type  -2.288***    -2.291***    -2.490***   
  (0.620)    (0.627)    (0.656)   
3.type  -3.058***    -3.150***    -3.234***   
  (0.879)    (0.908)    (0.941)   
4.type  -2.196***    -2.296***    -2.413***   
  (0.703)    (0.715)    (0.771)   
growth -0.334*** -0.345*** -0.341*** -0.339*** -0.306*** -0.315*** -0.317*** -0.318*** -0.307*** -0.312*** -0.310*** -0.319*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0747) (0.0694) (0.0724) (0.0695) (0.0737) (0.0672) (0.0721) (0.0775) (0.0759) (0.0716) (0.0794) 
financial 0.00910** 0.00937* 0.00905** 0.00793 0.0135** 0.0144** 0.0123** 0.0131** 0.0205*** 0.0177*** 0.0170*** 0.0192** 
 (0.00456) (0.00483) (0.00438) (0.00543) (0.00553) (0.00566) (0.00477) (0.00605) (0.00774) (0.00588) (0.00576) (0.00862) 
external -0.00847** -0.0118** -0.00749* -0.0108 -0.00718 -0.0109** -0.00582 -0.0110 -0.00797 -0.00949 -0.00547 -0.0148 
 (0.00417) (0.00459) (0.00424) (0.00666) (0.00479) (0.00556) (0.00439) (0.00681) (0.00754) (0.00590) (0.00626) (0.00952) 
effectiveness 1.339 1.846 1.433 0.932 0.736 0.979 1.042 -0.0111 0.252 0.871 0.829 -0.0827 
 (1.256) (1.345) (1.221) (1.537) (1.422) (1.522) (1.337) (1.454) (1.594) (1.528) (1.427) (1.559) 
regulatory -1.470 -1.206 -0.847 -0.904 -0.872 -0.567 -0.0611 -0.217 -2.013 -1.287 -0.920 -0.815 
 (1.199) (1.207) (1.176) (1.244) (1.263) (1.254) (1.175) (1.330) (1.627) (1.369) (1.374) (1.594) 
law 3.375** 4.147*** 2.507* 3.049* 3.698** 4.653*** 2.561* 3.581** 5.410** 5.005** 3.231 4.717* 
 (1.411) (1.504) (1.353) (1.797) (1.695) (1.794) (1.480) (1.808) (2.549) (2.054) (1.982) (2.440) 
corruption -2.874** -4.041*** -2.459** -2.376** -3.444*** -4.601*** -2.956*** -2.841** -4.019** -4.662*** -3.196** -3.402** 
 (1.156) (1.311) (1.117) (1.144) (1.232) (1.377) (1.125) (1.264) (1.595) (1.481) (1.314) (1.577) 
impulse -0.297***    -0.315***    -0.319***    
 (0.110)    (0.110)    (0.117)    
stabilizers   0.0320    0.0352*    0.0335  
   (0.0199)    (0.0207)    (0.0232)  
rule    -0.214    -0.416    -0.745* 
    (0.356)    (0.392)    (0.440) 
distortionary     -0.0870 -0.0797 -0.0918 -0.0780     
     (0.0708) (0.0766) (0.0631) (0.0797)     
nondistortionary         -0.595** -0.468** -0.425** -0.645** 
         (0.280) (0.188) (0.204) (0.282) 
Constant 4.447* 5.975** 3.730 4.755* -0.587 0.720 -1.076 -0.633 5.066 5.309* 2.616 5.798 
 (2.661) (2.770) (2.622) (2.880) (2.134) (2.272) (1.955) (2.369) (3.730) (2.895) (2.980) (3.651) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.2 Logit panel with random effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES             
             
expenditures 0.274*** 0.222** 0.255*** 0.302***         
 (0.106) (0.0982) (0.0986) (0.102)         
1.type  -1.428**    -1.437**    -1.650**   
  (0.725)    (0.715)    (0.684)   
2.type  -2.166***    -2.219***    -2.418***   
  (0.688)    (0.676)    (0.656)   
3.type  -3.399***    -3.278***    -3.412***   
  (1.008)    (0.996)    (0.956)   
4.type  -2.453***    -2.208***    -2.614***   
  (0.793)    (0.747)    (0.776)   
growth -0.179** -0.213*** -0.186** -0.188** -0.254*** -0.276*** -0.258*** -0.266*** -0.241*** -0.255*** -0.266*** -0.250*** 
 (0.0800) (0.0813) (0.0788) (0.0820) (0.0742) (0.0772) (0.0775) (0.0795) (0.0768) (0.0788) (0.0751) (0.0805) 
financial 0.0261*** 0.0246*** 0.0241*** 0.0247*** 0.0176** 0.0178*** 0.0187*** 0.0181** 0.0210*** 0.0210*** 0.0184*** 0.0204*** 
 (0.00773) (0.00729) (0.00692) (0.00795) (0.00685) (0.00660) (0.00718) (0.00748) (0.00646) (0.00638) (0.00547) (0.00711) 
external -0.00363 -0.00747 -0.00330 -0.0113 -0.0115 -0.0149* -0.0124 -0.0182** -0.00403 -0.00791 -0.00315 -0.0117 
 (0.00763) (0.00736) (0.00717) (0.00860) (0.00729) (0.00763) (0.00830) (0.00876) (0.00587) (0.00621) (0.00523) (0.00797) 
effectiveness -0.401 -0.195 0.164 -0.909 -0.621 -0.661 -0.570 -1.400 0.0136 0.217 0.418 -0.893 
 (1.820) (1.796) (1.689) (1.744) (1.655) (1.747) (1.689) (1.653) (1.568) (1.622) (1.390) (1.596) 
regulatory 0.693 0.986 1.703 2.102 -1.188 -0.709 -0.588 -0.533 -0.554 -0.0429 0.238 0.637 
 (1.829) (1.764) (1.730) (1.870) (1.561) (1.529) (1.622) (1.626) (1.463) (1.444) (1.333) (1.606) 
law 4.698** 5.010** 3.146 3.946* 6.029** 6.862*** 6.202** 6.723** 4.379** 5.013*** 2.988* 3.992* 
 (2.307) (2.187) (2.096) (2.353) (2.627) (2.555) (2.822) (2.690) (1.939) (1.927) (1.653) (2.085) 
corruption -5.240*** -5.781*** -4.747*** -4.467** -3.153** -4.136** -3.020* -2.595 -4.403*** -5.366*** -3.625*** -3.616** 
 (1.809) (1.751) (1.674) (1.785) (1.568) (1.631) (1.643) (1.637) (1.501) (1.566) (1.310) (1.521) 
impulse -0.310***    -0.269**    -0.355***    
 (0.111)    (0.112)    (0.118)    
stabilizers   0.0313    0.0370    0.0336  
   (0.0226)    (0.0235)    (0.0213)  
rule    -0.981**    -0.700*    -0.918* 
    (0.468)    (0.419)    (0.487) 
productive     1.016** 0.926** 1.295** 1.274***     
     (0.483) (0.469) (0.535) (0.480)     
unproductive         0.133 0.127 0.0814 0.180 
         (0.0991) (0.0974) (0.0827) (0.112) 
Constant -17.20*** -12.78** -16.81*** -18.39*** -12.60** -10.20** -16.36*** -15.38*** -6.620** -4.716 -5.720** -7.543** 
 (5.776) (5.346) (5.513) (5.709) (5.383) (5.129) (6.167) (5.537) (3.183) (3.042) (2.778) (3.489) 
             
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
